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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO 
ALAN DA VIS, EXECUTOR ) CASE NO. 312322 
Plaintiff, ) 
JUDGE RONALD SUSTER 
vs ) 
STATE OF OHIO ) DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR INJUNCTION 
Defendant ) FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER TO ENJOIN 
EXHUMATION OF MARILYN SHEPPARD 
Defendant, State of Ohio, by and through counsel, William D. Mason, and Assistant 
Prosecutor Marilyn B. Cassidy, sets forth herein its response to Plaintiffs motion to e~join 
exhumation of Marilyn Sheppard. Defendant's response is grounded upon the principle that the 
county prosecutor has statutory authority, independent of this Court's authority, and within his 
sound discretion to exhume a body pursuant to R.C. 313.18. Plaintiffs application for 
injunctive relief is both procedurally and substantively insufficient. Finally, the Prosecutor's 
order does not constitute an abuse of discretion, all as is set forth in the memorandum attached 
hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM D. MASON, 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY ~ 
A LYNB 
(0014647) 
Assistant Pr ecuting Attorney 
Justice Center 
1200 Ontario Street - 8th Floor 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
(216) 443-7785 
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF OHIO 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
INTRODUCTION 
On or about August 19, 1999, the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor ordered the exhumation 
of the remains of Marilyn Sheppard. The State of Ohio is named defendant in a civil action for 
wrongful imprisonment of Samuel H. Sheppard. The plaintiff alleges that Richard Eberling, and 
not Samuel H. Sheppard, committed the murder of Marilyn Sheppard in 1954. Hence, the civil 
action is based upon an underlying homicide, and the hypothesis that the murder was committed 
by Eberling, not Samuel H. Sheppard. The prosecutor is within his lawful authority to order the 
disinterment for the purpose of gaining further information relative to the commission of a crime 
within Cuyahoga County, especially where the State is exposed to civil liability arising from the 
same homicide. 
LAW AND ARGUMENT 
A. THE COUNTY PROSECUTOR HAS STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ORDER THE 
DISINTERMENT OF ANY DEAD BODY UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE 
CORONER 
R.C. 313.18 Disinterment of body 
The prosecuting attorney or coroner may order the disinterment of any 
dead body, under the direction and supervision of the coroner, and may 
authorize the removal of such body by the coroner to the quarters 
established for the use of such coroner, for the purpose of examination 
and autopsy. 
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The statutory language is clear. It is not within the purvue of the court to alter clear language. 
It is a cardinal rule that the court must first look to language of a statute itself to determine 
legislative intent. Courts do not have authority to ignore plain and unambiguous language of 
statute under guise of statutory interpretation, but must give effect to words used; in other words, 
courts may not delete words used or insert words not used. In re Collier (Athens 1993) 85 Ohio 
App. 3d 232. In interpreting a statute words must be taken in their usual, normal or customary 
meaning. Love v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. (Athens 1993) 86 Ohio App 3d 394. In Ohio, the 
specific inclusion by the legislature of items in a statute implies the exclusion of others. 
Kirsheman v. Paulin (1951), 155 Ohio St. 137, 146, Theobald v. Fugman, 64 Ohio St. 473. See 
also Investors Reit One v. Jacobs (1989) 46 Ohio St. 3d 176. 
Plaintiff argues that the intent of the statute is "to allow the state through the prosecutor 
or the coroner to investigate homicides". That position is not only erroneous but contrary to the 
plain language of the statute. There is no limiting language within R. C. 313 .18. The court may 
not impose limiting language that the legislature did not include. 
Additionally, the County Prosecutor is an elected official with specific powers and 
responsibilities to the citizens of the county. See R.C. 309.01 and 309.08. 
309.08 Powers and duties of prosecuting attorney; organized crime task force 
membership; rewards for information about drug related offenses. 
(A) The prosecuting attorney may inquire into the commission of 
crimes within the county. The prosecuting attorney shall prosecute, 
on behalf of the state, all complaints, suits, and controversies in 
which the state is a party .... 
The legislative language does not limit the prosecutor's authority to criminal actions. Rather, it is 
incumbent upon the prosecutor to conduct the legal affairs within his county where the state is 
a party. Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, defines the word "prosecute" as: 
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"1. To commence and carry out a legal action 2. To institute and 
pursue a criminal action against (a person) 3. To engage in; carry on" 
Under all of the foregoing statutory and case law, the prosecutor, as an elected official , is 
exercising his authority lawfully. Accordingly plaintiffs motion must be denied. 
B. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO SATISFY THE STANDARDS UNDER WHICH INJUNCTIVE 
RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED 
Ohio Civil Rule 65 sets forth the procedures by which a Temporary Restraining Order and 
an injunction may be sought. A petition for TRO requires that plaintiff file a verified complaint. 
An application for injunctive relief may be made by complaint or by motion. It is unclear from 
the document at bar exactly which remedy plaintiff herein seeks. As a matter of record, defendant 
objects to issuance of a TRO upon an unverified petition. Accordingly, defendant surmises that 
plaintiff seeks injunctive relief by motion pursuant to Ohio Rule 65. 
Although Civil Rule 65 does not specify the standards for issuing an injunction, the 
following guidelines are appropriate for a court's consideration: (1) the likelihood or probability 
of the movant's success on the merits; (3) whether the movant has an adequate remedy at law; (3) 
ifthe issuance of the preliminary injunction will prevent the claimed irreparable injury; (4) what 
injury to the parties and others will be served by the granting of injunctive relief; (5) the public 
interest that will be served by the granting of injunctive relief; (6) whether the injunctive relief 
sought is for the purpose of maintaining the status quo pending trial on the merits . Diamond Co. 
v. Gentry Acquisition Corp., Inc. (1988), 48 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 531 N.E. 2d 777. 
Furthermore, the award of an interlocutory injunction by courts of equity is not strictly a 
matter of right, even though irreparable injury may otherwise result to the plaintiff; even in suits 
in which only private interests are involved, the award is a matter of sound judicial discretion, in 
the exercise of which the court balances the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to 
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them according as they may be affected by the granting or witholding of the injunction, and it will 
avoid such inconvenience and injury so far as may be, by attaching conditions to the award, such 
as the requirement of an injunction bond conditioned upon payment of any damage caused by the 
injunction ifthe plaintiff's contentions are not sustained. Yakus v. U.S. (1944), 64 S.Ct. 660, 321 
U.S. 414, 88 L.Ed. 834. In determining whether a trial court committed an abuse of discretion in 
denying a preliminary injunction, the appellate court can consider (1) whether petitioner has 
made a strong showing of probable success at trial; (2) whether petitioner has shown irreparable 
injury; (3) whether issuance of the preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to other; 
( 4) where the public interest lies . 
In the case at bar, plaintiff has made no statement of irreparable harm, nor has he 
demonstrated probable success at the trial of this matter. Issuance of an injunction cannot be said 
to cause substantial harm to others. Finally, the State of Ohio submits that the public interest lies 
in learning as much information as possible in the case on the merits. Accordingly, plaintiff's 
motion must be denied. 
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C. DISINTERMENT OF MARILYN SHEPP ARD DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE 
OF THE DISCOVERY PROCESS, NOR DOES IT CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION BY THE PROSECUTOR 
As is discussed above, the county prosecutor may order the disinterment of a dead body 
in the exercise of his own powers and responsibilities as an elected official. Inasmuch, as the 
State of Ohio is the named defendant in a wrongful imprisonment action, it is proper for the 
prosecutor to defend the action. Indeed, the state and its elected officials have authority unique 
unto themselves. Logically, in a lawsuit against the state, these distinctions become evident. 
Plaintiff asserts that the Prosecutor's order to disinter Mrs. Sheppard amounts to an abuse 
of his discretion and abuse of the discovery process. Abuse of discretion connotes more than an 
error of law or judgment, it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or 
unconscionable." Blackemore v. Blakemore (1983), .5 Ohio St 3d 217 quoting State v. Adams 
(1980), 62 Ohio St 2d 151, 157. Abuse of discretion implies a decision that is without a 
reasonable basis and is clearly wrong. 
In the case at bar, a reasonable basis for disinterment is abundantly apparent. The 
Prosecutor's order is based soundly upon factual matters relative to a homicide in Cuyahoga 
County. The State of Ohio, represented by the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, is named defendant 
and exposed to liability in a lawsuit alleging that evidence relevant to the homicide should be 
reviewed. Fmiher, it is the plaintiff who has consistently argued to the court in this case, until 
now, that the office of the county prosecutor must make every effort within its authority to gain 
information concerning plaintiff's Eberling hypothesis. All of these matters form the basis of a 
rational decision within the authority of the prosecutor. 
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With regard to civil discovery rules, the independent authority of the prosecutor has been 
discussed. Plaintiff has no standing to request a protective order since the remains of Marilyn 
Sheppard are not sought pursuant to a discovery request, nor are they under his care, custody and 
control . However, the prosecutor is aware of his responsibilities under the rules with regard to 
supplementing witness and exhibit lists as necessary to allow plaintiff reasonable access to non-
privileged, discoverable information. To that end, the prosecutor is available, as soon as the 
scheduled pretrial date of August 30, 1999 to fully apprise the court and plaintiff's counsel, in 
chambers, as to the details of expert analysis which is expected to be conducted. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing facts and principles of law, defendant respectfully requests that plaintiff's 
motion be overruled. 
MARIL 647) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Injunction 
and/or Protective Order to Enjoin Exhumation was served via fax and via ordinary U.S. mail 
postage pre-paid upon Terry H. Gilbert, attorney for Plaintiff, at 1370 Ontario, Suite 1700, 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113, this 3 0 day of August, 1999. 
Assistant Prosecuting 
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